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Problem area 
Although the potential of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems 
(RPAS) is recognized, concerns are also voiced by the regulatory 
bodies involved over the safety aspects of providing the general 
public access to the airspace, especially in crowded areas such as 
West Europe. Dangerous situations such as near misses with both 
helicopters and commercial aircraft have already taken place. 
Various restrictions have therefore been put in place on operating 
mini RPAS in an attempt to maintain safety. Because these 
restrictions potentially can have a big effect on the prospects of 
this promising emerging field, it is important to determine 
whether the restrictions are effective in addressing the problems 
at hand. The aim of this study is to provide an up-to-date, user-
oriented overview of the (human error related) problems in 
operating mini RPAS. 
Description of work 
For this study, an operational focussed approach is chosen. First, 
a small exploratory trial was held to determine the (inherent) 
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difficulties in operating mini RPAS. Second, specific operational information was acquired by 
performing observations during operations and interviewing professional RPA operators. Where 
possible, an operational observation was also performed to contextualize the information. The 
results from these interviews and observations were analysed and categorised on the basis of 
standard theoretical human factors frameworks. This study is exploratory in nature. The choice 
was therefore made to limit the amount of interviews and observations. As a result, the 
outcomes are presented in a qualitative manner. Frequencies, prioritisation or other quantitative 
results are thus not presented. Direct associations between the causes and effects can also not 
be made.   
Results and conclusions 
The analysis performed on the RPA community revealed that human errors are taking place and 
that there are several preconditions for latent errors that could directly or indirectly lead to 
human errors, incidents and accidents. There is a strong presence of violations and organisational 
factors such as external pressures on the operator to operate beyond rules and regulations. 
Several knowledge and skill based mistakes were also reported. 
 
Applicability 
This study attempts to add to a safe and 
conscious RPAS community. The RPA 
community has a fragmented character and 
includes professionals, amateurs and officials 
(government). By actively sharing incident and 
accident data, awareness and knowledge 
about dangerous situations and platform 
limitations can be increased among RPA 
operators. This can potentially prevent some 
of the knowledge based mistakes. Access to 
incident and accident data might also increase 
the awareness of the technical reliance of RPA 
platforms/components. Although knowledge 
of the rules and regulations is commonly 
present among professional RPA operators, it 
is missing among most amateur or incidental 
operators. Clear, concise and easily accessible 
information on the do’s and don’ts for 
amateur/incidental RPAS operators can help in 
preventing knowledge based mistakes.  
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Abstract 
“To err is human”, but acceptance among the public and regulators of Remotely Piloted Aircraft 
Systems (RPAS) in the airspace is fragile and too many incidents and accidents can sway public 
opinion towards limiting Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) activity. Dangerous situations such as 
near misses with both helicopters and commercial aircraft have already taken place. Various 
restrictions have therefore been put in place on operating mini RPAS in an attempt to maintain 
safety. It is important to determine whether the restrictions are effective in addressing the 
problems at hand. This paper presents several human errors that occur among current day RPA 
operations within the current rules and regulations. Direct and indirect causes for these human 
errors are also identified, as well as causes for RPA incidents and accidents that do not involve 
human error, such as technical failures. Suggestions for preventing future incidents and accidents 
are presented.   
 
 
Keywords: RPAS, Operations, Operator, Human Error, Human Factors, Incidents, Accidents, 
Analysis. 
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1 Introduction  
The era of unmanned aircraft is upon us. Technological developments in the field of unmanned 
aircraft over the past decades have made the emergence of affordable and versatile platforms 
possible. Unlike earlier developments in the aviation sector, the developments in the field of mini 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) are not driven by the military or governmental 
domains, nor are they limited to large commercial institutes. The developments in mini RPAS 
have their roots in, and are largely driven by, non-commercial users/hobbyists and small 
commercial business. For the first time in aviation history, control of a flying platform is in the 
hands of the general public. Exotic new platforms are currently being developed. These 
developments are supported by the ‘symbiotic’ relationships that exist with other technological 
developments such as 3D printing and small digital devices like phones, tablets and gaming 
equipment. The uses for these platforms are almost as diverse as the forms they take: from 
photography to search and rescue and from geo mapping to pizza delivery (UVS international, 
2012).  
 
Although the potential of these platforms is recognized, concerns are also voiced by the 
regulatory bodies involved over the safety aspects of providing the general public access to the 
airspace, especially in crowded areas such as West Europe. Dangerous situations such as near 
misses with both helicopters and commercial aircraft have already taken place (NRC, 2013; ILENT, 
2013). Various restrictions have therefore been put in place on operating mini RPAS in an 
attempt to maintain safety.  
 
Because these restrictions potentially can have a big effect on the prospects of this promising 
emerging field, it is important to determine whether the restrictions are effective in addressing 
the problems at hand. This paper presents the study that is performed by the National Aerospace 
Laboratory (NLR) on the causes and effects of human error in mini RPAS. The aim of this study is 
to provide an up-to-date, user-oriented overview of the (human error related) problems in 
operating mini RPAS.  
 
1.1 Mini RPAS and their operations 
Mini RPAS are by far the most prevalent of unmanned aircraft as illustrated in the graph in Figure 
1. Mini RPAS fall within class I aircraft with a Maximum Take of Weight (MTOW) of less than 
150kg. Mini RPAS typically have a MTOW of 2-20 kg, operate up to 3000ft Above Ground Level 
(AGL) and have a 25km operating radius with Line of Sight (LOS) connection. Mini RPAS can be 
fixed wing, rotary wing and can sometimes even employ flapping wings. The prevalence of mini 
RPAS is understandable given the relatively low development costs, highly accessible technology 
and operational uses.  
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Fig. 1   Types of RPAS referenced by category (adapted from: the RPAS yearbook 2012-2013) 
 
Mini RPAS can be used for many different tasks. Most commonly, mini RPAS are used for 
providing aerial footage. This can be in the form of still photography, motion footage or in the 
form of mapping geo data using specialized sensors. Other uses for mini RPAS include inspections 
of valuable or high risk installations, search and rescue and taking (atmospheric) measurements 
(van Bleyenburgh, 2013).  
 
Along with the many variations of mini RPA platforms, there are many means of controlling a 
mini RPA (UVS international, 2012). Early versions of RPA control make use of Radio Controlled 
(R/C) controls typically seen in R/C controlled hobby vehicles and airplanes. R/C control allows 
fast and responsive input to the aircraft by directly controlling the power and steering. The 
downside of this type of control is that it requires continuous input from the operator and the 
operator has to take into account all variables that influence the output of the aircraft such as 
wind direction, speed and orientation of the platform. There is still a large body of operators that 
employ this method of control for primary input or as a safety control in case of an unresponsive 
aircraft. Commercial alternatives to this full manual control of the RPA include 
tablet/smartphone based applications that allow control of the aircraft using intuitive tilting 
input. Using on-board sensors, the aircraft maintains heading and position when no input is 
provided. Manoeuvring the platform does still require constant attention, and orientation issues 
remain when providing input. Alternatively, a Remote Pilot Station (RPS) can be used to control a 
mini RPA. RPS’s automate the flight aspects of controlling the RPA, by using Global Positioning 
System (GPS) based waypoint control. On-board sensors and computers stabilize the RPA to 
maintain the correct position/heading. RPS’s allow for precise and easy-to-use control of a RPA, 
freeing cognitive resources of the operator. The downside of this type of control is its reliance on 
on-board sensors and the fact that, unless equipped with advanced sensors and a high level of 
automation, flight paths typically do not take into account objects and obstacles. 
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The above mentioned means of control is representative for how a significant part of mini RPAS 
are controlled. However, there are several other input methods and hybrid solutions that are 
being employed by the community such as game controllers, R/C control with sensor feed or full 
scale RPS’s that are not discussed here. 
 
1.2 Rules and regulations 
The regulatory body in The Netherlands is currently still developing and fine tuning the rules and 
regulations regarding the operational use of (mini) RPAS. The same applies for most European 
countries, with one or two notable exceptions (e.g. the UK). The European Aviation Safety Agency 
(EASA) coordinates the development of rules and regulation for RPAS > 150 kg, whereas < 150 kg 
is regarded a National affair.  
 
The National rules and regulations stipulate that RPA are permitted to fly on an exemption basis. 
To be able to fly a (mini) RPA, the operator has to (Kruijswijk, 2013): 
• Proof reliability of the RPA (design and construction assessment + emergency behaviour 
cases); 
• Be a trained RPA operator (e.g. at EUTA or EURO USC) or comparable (Private Pilot 
Licence (PPL) / Commercial Pilot Licence (CPL)); 
• Have type specific training from the manufacturer; 
• Have available an operational handbook with, among others, standard working 
practices; 
• Have in place standardised procedures, Safety Management Systems (SMS) and 
insurance; 
• Adhere to the relevant rules of the air. 
 
When these conditions are met, RPAS below 150kg are allowed to operate in Visual Line of Sight 
(VLOS) of the operator under the following restrictions (see Figure 2): 
• VLOS operational area dimensions; 
• Maximum distance from pilot 500 m;  
• Maximum operation ceiling 400 ft; 
• Maximum speed 70 KNTS; 
• Not above ‘urban’ areas (min. 150 m distance); 
• Not above people (min. 150 m distance). 
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Fig. 2   Graphic representation of LOS rules and regulations in the Netherlands 
 
For this, a crew composition of 1 pilot, 1observer and 1 payload operator is required when the 
payload operator has to operate the payload during flight (e.g. during aerial photography work). 
Extended Visual Line of Sight (E-VLOS) is possible with one or more extended observers. This 
extended observer is necessary for operations that extend the boundaries of operations  
(>500 m). Beyond Visual Line of Sight (B-VLOS) operations are not yet permitted in the 
Netherlands’ airspace for commercial operations with mini RPAS. 
 
 
2 Research Approach 
2.1 Problem definition 
The mini RPAS field is fast emerging and fast developing. This presents challenges for both 
operators as regulators in finding safe and effective working conditions. Too little restrictions and 
the safety of air traffic and persons on the ground might be compromised. Too many restrictions 
and the prospects of this field might deteriorate. A clear view of the problems that occur during 
RPA operations within the current rules and regulations, and the underlying causes to these 
problems is needed.  
 
2.2 Goals  
The goal of this research project is to identify the causes and effects of human error in mini RPAS 
operations and to identify potential solutions to mitigate these causes and/or effects. The 
knowledge developed in this project can support and steer the development of new operating 
procedures, training courses, remote pilot station designs, rules and regulations, manning 
concepts and provide insight for other (new) R&D projects.  
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2.3 Research questions 
The following research questions are proposed:   
1. What human error problems occur during mini RPA (<150 kg) operations under the current 
rules and regulations? 
2. What are the underlying causes related to these human error problems? 
3. Can these aspects be addressed in training, procedures, system design or by other means?  
 
2.4 Methods 
In order to answer these research questions, it is necessary to understand when and how things 
go wrong as well as analyse the causes, impacts and relationships between human factors. For 
this, a mixed academic/operational approach is chosen.  
 
First, general insight on RPA incidents and accidents and underlying human factors is provided by 
performing a brief literature study.  
 
Second, to provide a baseline for the study, an exploratory experiment into the (inherent) 
difficulties in operating mini RPAS has been performed by letting a group of 15 participants 
(cognitive psychology students) operate mini RPAS under different circumstances. Participants 
were asked to perform a number of RPA operations related tasks such as following flight paths, 
manoeuvring through a track and providing separation from obstacles and other air traffic. 
Various control methods were used to represent the different manners of operating. Observation 
of their behaviour provided clues to the inherent difficulties in operating RPA’s.   
 
Third, specific operational information was acquired by performing observations during 
operations and interviewing professional RPA operators. Interviews were held with three 
different RPA operators to identify the problems operators face in daily operational use and to 
determine the underlying causes to these problems. Where possible, an operational observation 
was also performed to contextualize the information.  
 
The results from these interviews and observations were analysed and categorised on the basis 
of standard theoretical human factors frameworks. This study is exploratory in nature. The choice 
was therefore made to limit the amount of interviews and observations. As a result, the 
outcomes are presented in a qualitative manner. Frequencies, prioritisation or other quantitative 
results are thus not presented. Direct associations between the causes and effects can also not 
be made.  
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3 Results 
3.1 Human errors 
Several human errors were identified in the investigation that led to incidents/accidents or posed 
serious risks to the safety of the platform or environment. These human errors can be 
categorized according to the principal error types as described in Reason (1997) in skill based 
slips/lapses, knowledge and rule based mistakes and violations. This list is not exhaustive (does 
not include all possible human errors) and mostly relates to the professional RPA operator.  
Skill based slips and lapses 
• Tape over elevation sensor 
Knowledge and rule based mistakes 
• Load wrong flight planning/settings  
• Set wrong QNH 
• Forget to set home point, resulting in unpredictable RPA behaviour when loss of link 
occurs 
• Forget to reset settings on control input 
• Forget to check battery levels 
• Forget to take into account environment in setting safe ‘return home’ flying height 
• Misinterpret weather (at altitude) 
• Fly into bad weather 
Violations 
• Fly outside LOS to satisfy customer demands 
• Fly in restricted areas/without permit to satisfy customer demands  
• Fly with incomplete/incorrect crew composition due to time limitations/financial 
restrictions 
• Exceed flight time limitations resulting in fatigue 
• Unnecessarily perform stunts/public shows of airmanship  
• Unnecessarily fly too low over terrain/obstacles 
 
3.2 Causes 
The study into the causes and effects of human error in operating mini RPAS has uncovered a 
multitude of causes of incidents and accidents. Although the focus of this research was placed on 
human error, other causes of incidents and accidents such as technical failures and 
organisational/professional aspects are identified and presented as well, as they played an 
important role in the development of incidents and accidents.  
Underlying the incidents and accidents of mini RPAS are several different types of causation. 
Some of these causes (particularly the human factors) can lead directly to human errors, while 
other relate only indirectly or have a more direct/immediate impact on the safety. The following 
causes for mini RPAS incidents and accidents have been reported:   
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Technical failures 
 Manufacturing problems 
 Hardware malfunctions  
 Loss of link  
Technical problems with the platform, the control or the connection between control and 
platform are not uncommon. Most operators routinely perform pre-flight checks on the RPA 
before commencing a flight, to test whether the platform is technically sound, which prevents 
most technical failures. A loss of link between platform and control can also occur, resulting in an 
unresponsive aircraft. Most RPAS feature safety components that will return the RPA back to the 
landing point in a loss of link event. Manufacturing issues such as problems with weather 
resistance or fatigue of the various components are more difficult to prevent and control, and 
often lead to incidents and accidents when they occur.  
 
Human factors 
 Training & experience  
 Knowledge  
 Communication and coordination 
 Professional conduct  
 Fatigue and boredom 
The main contributor to human error in mini RPAS operations are human factors related causes 
such as lack of training, experience and knowledge. The exploratory experiment indicated that 
RPA’s are inherently difficult to control, and therefore specialized training is necessary. Inherently 
difficult aspects of operating an RPA include:  
• RPA control when under direct (manual) or assisted control mode and when the RPA has 
a different orientation then the operator (reverse or angled) 
• Estimation of distances and RPA orientation in symmetrical mini RPA’s (e.g. quad 
copters) 
• Estimation of effects of control inputs on the platform   
Deficiencies in knowledge, skills and experience in the operator can cause him/her to unwittingly 
violate rules and regulations, not foresee problems and inadequately interpret dangerous 
situations as well as handle emergency situations should they arise. Unfamiliarity with operating 
the platform (in part induced by the often wide array of different platforms available) can cause 
the operator to make slips, lapses and errors in operating, increasing the chance for incidents and 
accidents. The operators’ professional conduct is a specific contributor to incidents/accidents. 
Overconfidence in the operator’ own abilities can lead him/her to behave unprofessionally, 
operating the platform at or above the limitations and taking unnecessary risks. The lack of 
standardized communication and coordination techniques can lead to a lack of shared Situational 
Awareness (SA) between the operators. Furthermore extensive, long duration RPA operations 
can cause fatigue in the operator, as well as boredom under highly automated operation modes. 
The resulting inattention can cause accidents and incidents.   
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Organisational aspects 
 Violations  
 External pressures 
o Time pressure 
o Organisational pressure 
 Lack of a safety culture  
 Lack of currency training 
Organisational aspects are an important cause of incidents and accidents. External pressures such 
as commercial interest, time pressure or organisational pressure can ‘force’ a RPA operator into 
unsafe behaviour. Such violations are by nature less dangerous then mistakes, but are dangerous 
none the less. Most RPA operators do not have a full safety culture and/or maintain an incidents 
database. This lack of safety awareness has led to a situation where sharing knowledge and 
experiences is not the norm. Time pressure can lead the RPA operator to use shortcuts in the pre-
flight testing or other checks. Most RPA operators do not perform currency training (yet). This 
can lead to a loss of knowledge and (emergency handling) skills, resulting in an increased risk of 
incidents and accidents.  
 
Other 
 ‘Immaturity’ of RPAS field 
 Lack of control and supervision 
The relatively recent development of the RPA platform from mainly hobby into professional use 
has seen a fast growth of various different RPA manufacturers and sales agents. As a result, there 
is a varying level of professionalism, which can result in potentially dangerous aspects such as 
missing/poor operational manuals and/or incorrect sales advice. Some RPA operators do not 
possess the knowledge or experience to properly assess the quality of the 
platform/documentation. Operating without full knowledge of the operation and limitations of 
the system can result in incidents and accidents. Lastly, the lack of control and supervision on 
RPA operators creates the possibility for unprofessional conduct to arise and maintain. 
 
 
4 Discussion 
This study was exploratory in nature, and therefore not capable in providing a quantitative 
analysis of the current problems in RPA operations. The open, operational approach of 
interviewing operational RPA operators and performing observations did provide important 
insights in the problems that RPA operators face in their daily operations.  
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5 Conclusions 
“To err is human”, but acceptance among the public and regulators of RPAs in the airspace is 
fragile and too many incidents and accidents can sway public opinion towards limiting RPA 
activity. It is therefore in the interest of both the RPA community and the regulators to strive to 
have as little incidents and accidents as possible.  
In this study, we tried to answer the following questions:  
1. What human error problems occur during mini RPA (<150 kg) operations under the current 
rules and regulations? 
2. What are the underlying causes related to these human error problems? 
3. Can these aspects be addressed in training, procedures, system design or by other means? 
The analysis performed on the RPA community revealed that human errors are taking place and 
that there are several preconditions for latent errors that could directly or indirectly lead to 
human errors, incidents and accidents.  
Striking is the strong presence of violations and organisational factors such as external pressures 
on the operator to operate beyond rules and regulations. In part these violations can be 
explained as corner cutting, a by-product of having to be more cost effective than traditional 
means (such as helicopters). Another factor involved might be the lack of supervision and control 
of RPA operations.  
Several knowledge and skill based mistakes were also reported. These mistakes are most likely 
related to the experience levels of the RPA operators. Because the RPAS field is still relatively 
young, it is important to pay extra attention to the training and maintenance of skills, knowledge 
and attitudes among RPA operators. Furthermore, professional communication and coordination, 
Crew Resource Management (CRM), teamwork and safety mindedness should be practiced by all 
crew members to increase safety.  
The RPA community has a highly fragmented character and includes professionals, amateurs, 
official (government), who are safety aware/unaware, profit oriented, etc. By actively sharing 
incident and accident data, awareness and knowledge about dangerous situations and platform 
limitations can be increased among RPA operators. This can potentially prevent some of the 
knowledge based mistakes. Access to incident/accident data might also increase the awareness 
of the technical reliance of RPA platforms/components.  
Although knowledge of the rules and regulations is commonly present among professional RPA 
operators, it is missing among most amateur or incidental operators. Clear, concise and easily 
accessible information on the do’s and don’ts for amateur/incidental RPAS operators can help in 
preventing knowledge based mistakes.   
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W H A T  I S  N L R ?  
 
The  NL R  i s  a  D utc h o rg an i s at io n th at  i de n t i f i es ,  d ev e lop s  a n d a p pl i es  h i gh -t ech  know l ed g e i n  t he  
aero s pac e sec tor .  Th e NLR ’s  ac t i v i t i es  ar e  soc ia l ly  r e lev an t ,  m ar ke t-or i en ta te d ,  an d co n d uct ed  
no t- for - p ro f i t .  I n  t h i s ,  th e  NL R  s erv e s  to  bo ls te r  th e gove r nm en t ’s  i n nova t iv e  c apa b i l i t ie s ,  w h i l e  
a lso  p romot i ng  t he  i n nova t iv e  a n d com p et i t iv e  ca pa c i t ie s  o f  i t s  p ar tn er  com pa ni e s .  
 
The NLR,  renowned for i ts leading expert ise,  professional  approach and independent consultancy,  is  
staffed by c l ient-orientated personnel who are not only highly ski l led and educated,  but a lso  
continuously  strive to develop and improve their  competencies. The NLR moreover possesses an 
impressive array of  high qual ity research fac i l i t ies. 
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